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Do we need a human right to a healthy environment?
Rebecca Bratspies.
En: Santa Clara Journal of International Law.
Vol. 13, No. 1, 2015
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Resumen:
This paper contributes to the ongoing
discussion by identifying the relevant legal institutions and
procedures, and by exploring the substantive content of emerging
international norms surrounding environmental rights. Part I of this
paper describes why human rights are increasingly being invoked
in the context of environmental decision making. Part II offers a brief
introduction to the limitations of domestic and international
environmental law that drive interest in using human rights to address
environmental challenges. Part III surveys existing
human rights that have been pressed into service for environmental
ends, and highlights the strengths and weaknesses using existing human
rights norms to advance environmental goals. Part IV describes the
emerging norms coalescing around the human right to
a healthy environment. This section will re-analyze existing human
rights cases through an environmental rights lens to highlight what
environmental rights might add to the existing body of human rights law
and jurisprudence. Part V considers whether invoking
human rights extends state ability to regulate the environmental
conduct of non-state actors like transnational corporations. Finally,
Part VI returns to the introduction-putting human rights jurisprudence
in the context of the scope and scale of the environmental
problems we face. This section concludes with some reflections on the
possibility of change, of success in an era of rapid carbon accumulation
and profound environmental injustice.
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(En) gendering suffering: Denial of abortion as a form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Alyson Zureick.
En: Fordham International Law Journal.
Vol. 38, No. 1, 2015
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Resumen:
International law has long considered
the regulation of abortion to be a prerogative of the State. In recent
years, however, international human rights bodies have begun to consider
the conformity of domestic abortion regulations with States' human
rights obligations. This article identifies and
examines a notable trend among human rights bodies: namely, their
willingness to find that denying or obstructing a woman's access to
abortion can amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment ("CIDT")
under multiple human rights treaties. This article
identifies two lines of reasoning emerging from human rights bodies in
this area. First, human rights bodies have found that States can be
responsible for cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment inflicted on
women who are harassed and denied services that are
legally available to them under the State's laws. Second, human rights
bodies have found that the application of restrictive abortion laws
themselves may inflict CIDT by depriving women of an abortion in cases
such as rape or when the woman's life or health
is seriously threatened.
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"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race..."
Ronald Turner.
En: Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.
Vol. 11, No. 1, 2015
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Resumen:
This article examines
Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice Sotomayor's differing views on the
"way to stop discrimination on the basis of race." As discussed herein,
the justices' disagreement is grounded in and reflects fundamental
differences in their understandings of and approaches
to "race," racism, discrimination, and the operative meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Chief Justice Roberts's way to stop what he has framed as
race-based discrimination reflects an exclusive
focus on racial classifications and an acontextual and ahistorical
equal protection analysis? Disconnected from this nation's history and
the realities of white-supremacist racism, his focus on race as skin
color or phenotype renders constitutionally problematic
any and all governmental considerations of race. On that view,
discrimination on the basis of race (in the form of racial
classifications) can be ended by the cessation of governmental racial
classifications.
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Using targeted sanctions to end violations against children in armed conflict.
David S. Koller.
En: Boston University International Law Journal.
Vol. 33, No. 1, 2015
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Resumen:
This article examines
how the United Nations Security Council can more effectively utilize
the threat and use of sanctions to contribute to ending grave violations
against children in situations of armed conflict. The article reviews
the Security Council's efforts to address such
violations and observes that the Council has so far made limited use of
the possibility of sanctions. Drawing on lessons learned from the
Council's general practice in applying sanctions, this article considers
that sanctions can play an effective role in
influencing the behavior of potential and actual perpetrators of grave
violations against children, but that a number of difficult political,
practical, and legal challenges first need to be overcome. Taking these
challenges into account, this article offers
concrete recommendations for deploying the threat and use of sanctions
to help put an end to grave violations against children in situations of
armed conflict.
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Levels of generality and the protection of LGBT rights before the United Nations General Assembly.
Anthony S. Winer.
En: William Mitchell Law Review.
Vol. 41, No. 1, 2015
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Resumen:
Various countries
around the world have been according greater protection to the rights
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in recent
years.' At the same time, in other countries, the rights of LGBT people
are becoming more threatened. Against this backdrop,
it is worth noting that the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly has
never issued a resolution specifically protecting or advancing the
rights of LGBT people. This is remarkable given the significant role the
General Assembly has had in promulgating international
human rights. From the standpoint of advocates for LGBT rights, it
would be desirable for the General Assembly to issue such a resolution.
This article suggests part of a strategy to be implemented in pursuing
that goal.
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Building human rights, peace and development within the United Nations.
Christian Guillermet Fernández y David Fernández Puyana.
Russian Law Journal.
Vol. 41, No. 1, 2015
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Resumen:
War and peace have
perpetually alternated in history. Consequently, peace has always been
seen as an endless project, even a dream, to be in brotherhood realized
by everyone across the earth. Since the XVII century the elimination of
war and armed conflict has been a political
and humanitarian objective of all nations in the world. Both the League
of Nations and the United Nations were conceived with the spirit of
eliminating the risk of war through the promotion of peace, cooperation
and solidarity among Nations. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent human rights instruments
were drafted with a sincere aspiration of promoting the value of peace
and human rights worldwide. International practice shows the close
linkage between the disregard of human rights
and the existence of war and armed conflict. It follows that the role
of human rights in the prevention of war and armed conflict is very
important. Since 2008 the Human Rights Council has been working on the
'Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace.' Pursuant
resolutions 20/15 and 23/16 the Council decided firstly to establish,
and secondly to extend the mandate of the Open-Ended Working Group
(OEWG) aimed at progressively negotiating a draft United Nations
declaration on the right to peace. The OEGW welcomed in
its second session (July2014) the approach of the
Chairperson-Rapporteur, which is basically based on the relationship
between the right to life and human rights, peace and development.
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Reflections on the question of when, if ever, violence is justified in struggles for political or social change.
Susan H. Farbstein.
En: Harvard Human Rights Journal.
Vol. 27, 2014
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Resumen:
Violence is never
justified in struggles to transition from one regime to another;
violence is bound to have a dehumanizing effect on those who perpetrate
it and therefore a negative impact on any social or political
arrangement that emerges. However, the answer is ultimately
not completely satisfying. We may have to face the reality that
governments are sometimes so evil, so cruel, so unjust, and so
destructive that people have a right to resist by force. The concern is
that insistence on non-violence may sometimes reinforce injustice.
In certain circumstances, force may be the last appeal to human dignity
and the last resort to realizing human rights.
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An
Inter-American Constitutional Court?: The invention of the
conventionality control by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Ariel E. Dulitzky.
En: Texas International Law Journal.
Vol. 50, No. 1, 2015
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Resumen:
Charles Evans Hughes
said more than a hundred years ago that "[w]e are under a Constitution,
but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." Today,
nevertheless, in Latin America, it would be more appropriate to say that
we are under the American Convention on Human Rights,
but the Convention is what the judges of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights say it is. This change in the paradigm comes thanks to the
conventionality control theory developed by the InterAmerican Court of
Human Rights ("Court" or "Inter-American Court")
in the last several years. In brief, this conventionality control (or
control of conventionality) demands that inter-American and domestic
judges examine the compatibility of national rules and practice with the
American Convention on Human Rights ("Convention"
or "American Convention") as interpreted by the Inter-American Court.
For domestic judges, this duty comes in addition to traditional
constitutionality control or judicial review within their respective
States.
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